Este artigo apresenta uma discussão historiográfica sobre a fonte histórica conhecida como Epítome Heidelberg, um documento grego do século XV de autoria disputada e que trata dos primórdios do período helenístico. Propõe especialmente avançar no debate a partir da tese de Pat Wheatley ao inserir o documento em epígrafe em uma breve discussão conceitual e metodológica sobre epítomes e fragmentos na historiografia grega.

Este artigo tem por objetivo criticar a teoria do modelo ocidental de guerra, proposta por Hanson, a partir do que a historiografia tem identificado como seus principais problemas: a alegada continuidade da arte da guerra ocidental através dos séculos, começando com os gregos antigos; e o chamado “contraste asiático”, com alguns dos seus desdobramentos. Assim, o texto está dividido em três seções: 1) a apresentação e os méritos da teoria de Hanson; 2) suas bases clássicas, ou a ênfase da arte (...) da guerra grega na batalha decisiva como uma “escolha cultural”; 3) as críticas pertinentes. (shrink)

Olympe de Gouges publica as Réflexions sur les hommes nègres no ano de 1788. Com ideias abolicionistas, a autora aborda a condição dos escravos negros no Século das Luzes, em um contexto de profusão do ideário dos progressos da razão em todos os campos do saber. Ela evidencia, porém, que os ideais de liberdade, igualdade e fraternidade ainda estavam bastante aquém de serem praticados ao pé da letra.

Em seu Système de la nature, Holbach afirma que algumas ideias que o homem engendra dentro de si são derivadas de uma oscilação dos humores que o impede de entrever quais as razões de atribuir um caráter sacro a certas palavras ou opiniões. Nesse sentido, as paixões, longe de serem romantizadas e levarem vantagem em relação à reta razão justamente por serem menos frias e mais lúdicas, sob a pena do barão ganham uma imagem negativa, definidas como verdadeiros obstáculos ao (...) homem que pretende entender os princípios, o curso e as leis da natureza dispensando o recurso a instâncias ou entidades sobrenaturais criadas pela imaginação, pela inconstância dos humores ou pela linguagem. Palavras-chave : Holbach. Paixões. Divindade. (shrink)

Em um pequeno escrito intitulado Apologie de l’ennui et des ennuyeux, Holbach, sob uma apologia, repudia a figura do ennuyeux. O retrato dos costumes traçado pelo Barão é acompanhado de uma crítica filosófica que remonta às causas originais tanto da propagação como da universalidade do tédio. Tal reflexão o Barão já empreendera em La Moral Universelle, o que permite fazer uma leitura da Apologie como uma crítica invertida, por meio de uma condenação contundente do tédio, este entendido como uma permanente (...) insatisfação da natureza humana. (shrink)

Resumo: A superstição é definida por Bayle, em diversos momentos e diversas obras do filósofo francês, como: a) algo característico da corrupção natural humana; b) a prova da facilidade do homem em se ater às mais diversas crendices, logo, estando sujeito não só a uma, mas a todo tipo de superstições; c) o fenômeno que se instaurou e se disseminou na sociedade, perseguindo a todos e gerando ilusões por toda parte, através de presságios, profecias, prodígios, e sinais. Nesse quadro de (...) diversas e intangíveis absurdidades, a superstição ganha forma, indo para além dos domínios da razão e, assim, Bayle, em seus escritos, torna manifesta a oposição entre a filosofia e a ignorância supersticiosa, entre o entendimento e a imaginação e entre as explicações científicas e os relatos fantásticos.: Superstition is defined by Bayle at various times and in various works as: a) something characteristic of natural human corruption; b) proof of the ease of man in adhering to the most diverse beliefs, being subject not only to one but to all kinds of superstitions; c) a phenomenon which arose and spread in society, following everyone and creating illusions everywhere by means of omens, prophecies, miracles, and signs. In this context of the diverse and intangible absurdities in which superstition takes shape, going beyond the realms of reason, Bayle in his writings makes manifest the opposition between philosophy and superstitious ignorance, between understanding and imagination, and between scientific explanations and fantastic tales. (shrink)

Quando Bayle reflete sobre a possibilidade de um ateísmo especulativo, ele argumenta acuradamente a respeito, mostra que o ateísmo pode dar sua contribuição a diversas discussões de ordem teórica, como a questão do livre-arbítrio, da providência e do mal, por exemplo. Se o filósofo de Carla se pronuncia a favor do ateísmo especulativo, ele vai mais além e afirma uma moral natural, a qual, apoiada em princípios comuns a todos os homens, permite vislumbrar e dar solidez a sua tese fundamental (...) desde os Pensées diverses sur la comète: a associação entre ateísmo e virtude. Dessa forma, Bayle expõe e analisa os diversos argumentos e pontos de vista a respeito do estatuto filosófico do ateísmo especulativo. (shrink)

O manuscrito clandestino Jordanus Brunus redivivus ou Traité des erreurs populaires foi publicado em 1771, não trazendo indicação alguma de sua autoria. Entretanto, a despeito do anonimato da obra, ela tornou-se um dos textos mais famosos dentre a filosofia clandestina do século XVIII, aludindo a um filósofo que foi uma das maiores vítimas da superstição e do fanatismo de sua época: Giordano Bruno. O título do escrito é uma espécie de homenagem ao pensador italiano, mas não há no decorrer da (...) obra uma menção sequer que comprove que o autor anônimo tenha lido uma linha de suas obras, mesmo que seja considerado o elo filosófico de união entre o brunismo da primeira metade do século XVII e o da segunda metade do século XVIII. É em um encadeamento de ideias progressivo no Jordanus Brunus que nos permite encontrar o fio condutor das reflexões do autor: a sua formulação do ateísmo caracteriza-se por sua abordagem não dogmática, dissimulada, preparando o solo para o racionalismo ateu que estaria por vir. O presente artigo limitar-se-á à terceira e quarta partes do manuscrito, nas quais o autor anônimo vai tratar diretamente da questão da existência de deus e fazer diversas objeções às provas de sua existência. (shrink)

Circunscrevendo o âmbito no qual o ateísmo pode ser compreendido, a saber, na esfera dos costumes, convenções religiosas, políticas e teológicas, e até mesmo no campo dos temperamentos e caracteres, desde os Pensées diverses sur la comète até a Continuation des Pensées sur la comète e a Réponse aux quéstions d’un Provincial Bayle erige, fundamenta e radicaliza o vínculo entre ateísmo e virtude, entendendo aqui ateísmo sob um enfoque de caráter prático, ou seja, em relação à atitude daqueles que vivem (...) como se um deus não existisse, minimizando o valor de sua eficácia sobre a conduta humana. Porém, tal postura não é menos dotada de virtude, uma vez que se entenda tal termo como uma perpétua disposição para cumprir determinados atos morais e tendo como objeto os atos da vida prática, como por exemplo, justiça, honestidade, coragem, amizade, entre outros. (shrink)

The current dispute between causalists and simulationists in philosophy of memory has led to opposing attempts to characterize the relationship between memory and imagination. In a recent overview of this debate, Perrin and Michaelian have suggested that the dispute over the continuity between memory and imagination boils down to the question of whether a causal connection to a past event is necessary for remembering. By developing an argument based on an analogy to perception, I argue that this dispute should instead (...) be viewed as a dispute about the nature of the attitudes involved in remembering and imagining. The focus on attitudes, rather than on causal connections, suggests a new way of conceiving of the relationship between memory and imagination that has been overlooked in recent philosophy of memory. (shrink)

O que é o lembrar? Quando podemos dizer que um sujeito lembra um evento do passado? Essas são duas questões centrais na filosofia da memória, uma área que vem experimentando uma rápida expansão nos últimos anos. Por quase meio século, a teoria causal da memória, inicialmente proposta por Martin e Deutscher, dominou o debate sobre como devemos responder às duas questões iniciais. Mais recentemente, no entanto, a teoria causal se tornou alvo de duras críticas, o que motivou os filósofos da (...) memória a desenvolverem duas novas teorias sobre o lembrar: a teoria simulacionista e a teoria funcionalista. Neste artigo, exploramos essas teorias em mais detalhes com o objetivo de tornar mais claro quais são seus comprometimentos, assim como suas vantagens e desvantagens. (shrink)

No momento em que oposições seculares – tais como real versus imaginário, razão versus mito, inteligível versus sensível, vida mental versus vida material – se encurtam e o poder passa a ser exercido não só pela coerção material, mas também pela dominação simbólica, percebe-se que, cada vez mais, procura-se conciliar razão e imaginário. Entende-se, assim, que a tradição é mantida através dos mitos e das lendas. O que se deseja, realmente, é manter-se o passado dentro do futuro. A sociedade tem, (...) como objetivo, o futuro. Entretanto, ela se mantém sob as regras do passado. O imaginário é sempre, em certa medida, imitação do passado, mas é uma imitação deformada pelo próprio mecanismo de projeção, que mais não pode fazer a não ser transformar os preceitos, as estruturas adquiridas pelas aprendizagens adaptativas, suprimindo-lhes outros preceitos e outras estruturas, condicionando-os a tornarem-se, sem apelo nem agravo, diferentes daquilo que são. A criança não está livre desse processo. Constantemente ela é bombardeada pelas imagens publicitárias, cinematográficas e televisionada, além das várias modalidades de Literatura que permeiam o seu cotidiano. Palavras-chave: Literatura fantástica; Infância; Imaginário e religião. ABSTRACT In a moment when secular oppositions curtail (such as the real versus the imaginary, reason versus myth, the intelligible versus the sensitive, mental life versus material life) and power comes to be exerted not only through material coercion but also through symbolical domination, one notices a growing tendency towards conciliating reason and the imaginary. Thus, tradition is kept through myths and legends, as the aim is really to hold the past inside the future. Society aims at the future. However, it keeps the rules of the past. In a way, the imaginary is always an imitation of the past, but an imitation deformed by its own projection mechanism, which cannot but transform precepts and frameworks acquired through adaptive learning, suppressing other precepts and frameworks and conditioning them to become different from what they are. The child is not free from that process, being constantly exposed to publicity, cinema and television images, besides the various kinds of literature that permeate his daily life. Key words: Fantastic literature; Childhood; The imaginary and religion. (shrink)

This paper aims to examine the place of the dramatic in the Anthropological Structures of the Imaginary, through a comparative approach between this work and two others : Les Concepts fondamentaux de poétique and Les Deux cent mille situations dramatiques, in order to consider another possible order for the sequence of the structures proposed by Gilbert Durand, although the author declared in a note that he did not choose to follow « the ontogenetic plane of the emergence of dominant reflexes (...) ». (shrink)

Neste artigo apresentamos, de forma concisa e em português, alguns elementos-chave dos principais debates contemporâneos na filosofia da memória. Nosso principal objetivo é tornar essas discussões mais acessíveis aos leitores de língua portuguesa, fornecendo uma atualização importante para esforços anteriores (Sant’Anna & Michaelian, 2019a). Começamos introduzindo a noção de viagem no tempo mental, a qual estabelece a base empírica para a metodologia empregada em trabalhos recentes, antes de apresentar dois debates centrais. Primeiro, o debate entre causalistas e simulacionistas (...) sobre a teoria da lembrança filosoficamente correta (§2). Segundo, o debate entre continuístas e descontinuístas sobre a relação entre lembrança episódica e certas formas de imaginação (em particular, o pensamento episódico acerca do futuro) (§3). Na segunda parte do artigo, apresentamos e exploramos dois tópicos de discussão crescente: a natureza do sentimento de passado característico da memória episódica (§4) e questões de meta-nível relativas ao próprio caráter das controvérsias exploradas na primeira parte do artigo (§5). (shrink)

Neste artigo procura-se responder ao desafio da leitura de Heidegger no que concerne à possibilidade de uma relação entre ontologia e ética.O autor investiga a possibilidade da colocação do problema de tal relação,privilegiando a noção heideggeriana de liberdade.

Research involving transgender and gender diverse people (TGD) increased in the last years, mostly concerning healthcare associated to this population. Few studies dedicated their analysis to the impact of parental support on transgender people, even though this is an important aspect in creating a safe environment on which these individuals can build their identity. In addition, the link between family support, TGD identity and homelessness is not completely established. Thus, due to the specificities of the family context of TGD individuals, (...) the aim of this study is to investigate the association between family support and TGD in different moments of the process of gender affirmation. In addition, this study also aims to explore the relationship between a lack of social support and low self-esteem, home abandonment, and dwelling in the street. The survey was designed based on the TransPULSE project and was made available in electronic format. The sample was constituted of 423 TGD residents in two Brazilian states. A Structural Equation Model analysis suggested that the impact of gender affirmation status on homelessness was mediated by parental support, through self-esteem, and the need to move from home. The association between the status of the gender affirmation procedures, family support and self-esteem was significant and indicated that the further TGD individuals advanced in gender affirmation, the more self-esteem and family support they would have. The association between family support and self-esteem indicated that family support was associated with higher self-esteem. Low family support was associated with the willingness to move from home due to one’s TGD status and there was also a significant correlation between low self-esteem and the willingness to move from home due to one’s TGD status. Finally, homelessness was associated with the willingness to move with a large effect size. Limitations include the sample that was constituted by individuals with Internet access and who had more contact with TGD communities. The findings indicate directions for interventions involving TGD people and their families, considering the parental relationship as a critical variable to improve TGD quality of life in the process of gender affirmation. (shrink)

BackgroundFor a long time, in sports, researchers have tried to understand an expert by comparing them with novices, raising the doubts if the visual search characteristics distinguish experts from novices. Therefore, the aim of the present study was to review and conduct a meta-analysis to evaluate the differences in visual search behavior between experts and novices in team sports athletes.MethodsThis systematic review with meta-analysis followed the PRISMA 2020 and Cochrane's guidelines. Healthy team athletes were included, which engaged in regular practice, (...) from any sex or competitive level, specifically classified a priori as expert or novice in the original research. We considered only research published in peer-reviewed journals, with no limitations regarding date or language. It was considered healthy team sport athletes engaged in regular practice. The scenarios could be in situ or film-based. The databases of EBSCO, PubMed, Scopus, SPORTDiscus, and Web of Science were used to perform the searches. The risk of bias was calculated through the RoBANS tool.ResultsFrom a total of 6,257 records, of which 985 were duplicates, titles and abstracts of 5,272 were screened, and 45 required full-text analysis. Of those, 23 were excluded due to not fulfilling the eligibility criteria regarding participants. In the end, 22 studies were selected, however, as two studies were part of the same trial and were analyzed conjointly.DiscussionExperts showed to be older and with more years of practice. The ability to distinguish experts from novices was not so clear regarding the variables analyzed. This could be due to the strategies chosen in each study, which were specific to each scenario, and when grouping all together, it was lost information within non-representative averages. The distinction between experts and novices was not clear, showing a lot of heterogeneity in the included studies. The expert classification itself may have been the conditioning aspect for these results, retaining the doubt and the need for more studies in the field.Systematic review registrationThe protocol was pre-registered in OSF. (shrink)

Our contribution is part of the REMILAS project, a research on interactions between asylum seekers and health professionals, with or without interpreters. Here we observe the emergence, expected or not by professionals, of snippets of migration narratives. Our study combines multimodal analysis of interactions (Sidnell & Stivers, 2012) with a critical sociolinguistic perspective (Boutet & Heller, 2007) so as to inform the development of training methods. Our empirical focus will be on interactional moments where the doctor, searching for the information (...) needed to write an expert medical certificate, repeatedly urges the applicant to make certain responses required in it. (shrink)

This paper proposes a novel account of the contents of memory. By drawing on insights from the philosophy of perception, I propose a hybrid account of the contents of memory designed to preserve important aspects of representationalist and relationalist views. The hybrid view I propose also contributes to two ongoing debates in philosophy of memory. First, I argue that, in opposition to eternalist views, the hybrid view offers a less metaphysically-charged solution to the co-temporality problem. Second, I show how the (...) hybrid view conceives of the relationship between episodic memory and other forms of episodic thinking. I conclude by considering some disanalogies between perception and memory and by replying to objections. I argue that, despite there being important differences between memory and perception, those differences do not harm my project. (shrink)

The debate over the objects of episodic memory has for some time been stalled, with few alternatives to familiar forms of direct and indirect realism being advanced. This paper moves the debate forward by building on insights from the recent psychological literature on memory as a form of episodic hypothetical thought (or mental time travel) and the recent philosophical literature on relationalist and representationalist approaches to perception. The former suggests that an adequate account of the objects of episodic memory will (...) have to be a special case of an account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought more generally. The latter suggests that an adequate account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought will have to combine features of direct realism and representationalism. We develop a novel pragmatist-inspired account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought that has the requisite features. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between a prominent version of the relational view of memory and recent work on forms of unsuccessful remembering or memory errors. I argue that unsuccessful remembering poses an important challenge for the relational view. Unsuccessful remembering can be divided into two kinds: misremembering and confabulating. I discuss each of these cases in light of a recent relational account, according to which remembering is characterized by an experiential relation to past events, and I argue that experiential (...) relations do not adequately distinguish between remembering and unsuccessful remembering. This is because there are, on the one hand, cases of remembering that do not instantiate the relevant experiential relations, and, on the other hand, cases of confabulation and misremembering that do instantiate the relevant experiential relations. I conclude by suggesting that any successful relationalist attempt to explain remembering needs to come to grips with unsuccessful remembering. (shrink)

Originally understood as memory for the “what”, the “when”, and the “where” of experienced past events, episodic memory has, in recent years, been redefined as a form of past-oriented mental time travel. Following a brief review of empirical research on memory as mental time travel, this introduction provides an overview of the contributions to the special issue, which explore the theoretical implications of that research.

The questions of whether episodic memory is a propositional attitude, and of whether it has propositional content, are central to discussions about how memory represents the world, what mental states should count as memories, and what kind of beings are capable of remembering. Despite its importance to such topics, these questions have not been addressed explicitly in the recent literature in philosophy of memory. In one of the very few pieces dealing with the topic, Fernández (2006) provides a positive answer (...) to the initial questions by arguing that the propositional attitude view of memory, as I will call it, provides a simple account of how memory possesses truth-conditions. A similar suggestion is made by Byrne (2010) when he proposes that perception and episodic memory have the same kind of content, differing only in degree. Against the propositional attitude view, I will argue that episodic memory does not have propositional content, and therefore, that it is not a propositional attitude. My project here is, therefore, mainly critical. I will show that, if empirical work is to inform our philosophical theories of memory in any way, we have good reasons to deny, or at least to be skeptical, of the prospects of the propositional attitude view of episodic memory. (shrink)

Alethism is the view that successful remembering only requires an accurate representation of a past event. It opposes the truth-and-authenticity view, according to which successful remembering requires both an accurate representation of a past event and an accurate representation of a past experience of that event. Alethism is able to handle problematic cases faced by the truth-and-authenticity view, but it faces an important challenge of its own: If successful remembering only requires accurately representing past events, then how is it possible (...) that our memories are also experienced as originating in past experiences of those events? I call this the puzzle of alethic memory. I argue that alethism can be reconciled with the claim that memories are experienced as originating in past experiences of those events—what I call the experience of first-handedness—if we conceive of the phenomenology of remembering in metacognitive terms. According to the metacognitive approach that I favor, the phenomenology of remembering is partly explained by what memory represents and partly explained by the existence of a metacognitive feeling that accompanies memory representations. I argue that accounting for the feeling of first-handedness in terms of the metacognitive feeling that accompanies memory representations allows us to solve the puzzle of alethic memory. (shrink)

The (dis)continuism debate—the debate over whether remembering is a form of imagining—is a prominent one in contemporary philosophy of memory. In recent work, Langland-Hassan (2021) has argued that this debate is best understood as a dispute over whether remembering is a form of constructive imagining. In this paper, I argue that remembering is not a form of constructive imagining because constructive processes in remembering and imagining are constrained, and hence controlled, in different ways at the level of consciousness. More specifically, (...) I argue that remembering and imagining differ in terms of the interventions we can make on the constructive processes as they unfold. If this is correct, then a form of discontinuism is vindicated: remembering and imagining are, on this view, processes of different kinds. (shrink)

This paper develops a theory of perception that reconciles representationalism and relationalism by relying on pragmatist ideas. I call it the pragmatic view of perception. I argue that fully reconciling representationalism and relationalism requires, first, providing a theory in which how we perceive the world involves representations; second, preserving the idea that perception is constitutively shaped by its objects; and third, offering a direct realist account of perception. This constitutes what I call the Hybrid Triad. I discuss how Charles Peirce’s (...) theory of perception can provide a framework for such a view and I devote the rest of the paper to developing my own pragmatic and Peircean theory of perception. In particular, I argue that considering perception as a continuous temporal process, which essentially involves interaction with the environment, allows us to do justice to the Hybrid Triad. I motivate this view by discussing how a pragmatic theory of perception would deal with issues such as the distinction between veridical and non-veridical experiences and the nature of perceptual objects. (shrink)

The idea that episodic memory is distinguished from semantic memory by the fact that it involves autonoetic consciousness, initially introduced by Tulving, has been influential not only in psychology but also in philosophy, where a variety of approaches to autonoesis and to its relationship to episodicity have been developed. This article provides a critical review of the available philosophical approaches. Distinguishing among representational, metacognitive, and epistemic accounts of autonoesis, it considers these in relation to objective and subjective conceptions of episodicity (...) and assesses them against immediacy and source criteria that any philosophical account of autonoesis should arguably aim to satisfy. (shrink)

lf addiction is the disease of the epoch, women are its greatest victims. Not only are they the population most affected by this “disease,” the campaigns and treatments designed to treat women’s addictions are both ineffective and (worse) demonstrably sexist, racist, and misogynist (Greaves, 1996). This paper situates the hermeneutics of (the disease of) addiction and the analysis of appropriate treatments for this “disease” within the broader social and historical contexts that shape gendered paradigms of health and the “healthy free (...) will” (Sedgwick). Following contemporary work in the Humanities, the Social Sciences and the Arts (Greaves, Sedgwick, Hutcheon, Klein, et al.), I shall investigate the ways in which cultural and philosophical systems of representation and social, political and economic systems ofinequality contribute to interlacing often contradictory paradigms of dependency and independency. I shall close with some solutions that utilize a number of faculties to be found in art, literature, and culture.Si la dépendance est le mal du siècle, les femmes en sont les plus grandes victimes. Non seulement forment elles la population la plus touchée par cette “maladie”, mais les traitements destinés à les libérer de leurs dépendances sont à la fois inefficaces et (pis encore) sexistes, racistes et misogyne (Greaves, 1996). Cet article établira une herméneutique de la (maladie de la) dépendance et analysera destraitements appropriés dans les contextes plus larges de société et d’histoire qui forment des paradigmes sexuels de santé et d’une “saine volonté libre” (Sedgwick). À la suite de travaux contemporains dans les domaines des humanités, des sciences sociales et des arts (Greaves, Sedgwick, Htcheon, Klein, et al), il examinera les façons desquelles les systèmes culturels et philosophiques de représentation, de même que les systèmes social, politique et économique des inégalités, contribuent au lacis des paradigmes de dépendance et d’indépendance, souvent contradictoires. Il terminera avec quelques solutions qui utilisent les possibilités qu’on peut trouver dans les arts, la littérature et la culture. (shrink)

lf addiction is the disease of the epoch, women are its greatest victims. Not only are they the population most affected by this “disease,” the campaigns and treatments designed to treat women’s addictions are both ineffective and (worse) demonstrably sexist, racist, and misogynist (Greaves, 1996). This paper situates the hermeneutics of (the disease of) addiction and the analysis of appropriate treatments for this “disease” within the broader social and historical contexts that shape gendered paradigms of health and the “healthy free (...) will” (Sedgwick). Following contemporary work in the Humanities, the Social Sciences and the Arts (Greaves, Sedgwick, Hutcheon, Klein, et al.), I shall investigate the ways in which cultural and philosophical systems of representation and social, political and economic systems ofinequality contribute to interlacing often contradictory paradigms of dependency and independency. I shall close with some solutions that utilize a number of faculties to be found in art, literature, and culture.Si la dépendance est le mal du siècle, les femmes en sont les plus grandes victimes. Non seulement forment elles la population la plus touchée par cette “maladie”, mais les traitements destinés à les libérer de leurs dépendances sont à la fois inefficaces et (pis encore) sexistes, racistes et misogyne (Greaves, 1996). Cet article établira une herméneutique de la (maladie de la) dépendance et analysera destraitements appropriés dans les contextes plus larges de société et d’histoire qui forment des paradigmes sexuels de santé et d’une “saine volonté libre” (Sedgwick). À la suite de travaux contemporains dans les domaines des humanités, des sciences sociales et des arts (Greaves, Sedgwick, Htcheon, Klein, et al), il examinera les façons desquelles les systèmes culturels et philosophiques de représentation, de même que les systèmes social, politique et économique des inégalités, contribuent au lacis des paradigmes de dépendance et d’indépendance, souvent contradictoires. Il terminera avec quelques solutions qui utilisent les possibilités qu’on peut trouver dans les arts, la littérature et la culture. (shrink)

The 12 chapters cover 6 questions: I. What is the relationship between memory and imagination? II. Do memory traces have content? III. What is the nature of mnemonic confabulation? IV. What is the function of episodic memory? V. Do non-human animals have episodic memory? VI. Does episodic memory give us knowledge of the past?

The viability of a naïve realist theory of memory was a lively debate for philosophers of mind in the first half of the twentieth century. More recently, though, naïve realism has been largely abandoned as a non-starter in the memory literature, with representationalism being the standard view held by philosophers of memory. But rather than being carefully argued, the dismissal of naïve realism is an assumption that sits at the back of much recent theorizing in the philosophy of memory. In (...) this paper, we identify three reasons why philosophers of memory have felt compelled to outright reject naïve realism. We argue that none of those reasons are successful. Thus, far from being a non-starter, we argue that naïve realism is a theoretical perspective that needs to be given serious consideration in current philosophy of memory debates. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Justin D’Ambrosio (2020) has offered an empirical argument in support of a negative solution to the puzzle of Macbeth’s dagger—namely, the question of whether, in the famous scene from Shakespeare’s play, Macbeth sees a dagger in front of him. D’Ambrosio’s strategy consists in showing that “seeing” is not an existence-neutral verb; that is, that the way it is used in ordinary language is not neutral with respect to whether its complement exists. In this paper, we offer (...) an empirical argument in favor of an existence-neutral reading of “seeing”. In particular, we argue that existence-neutral readings are readily available to language users. We thus call into question D’Ambrosio’s argument for the claim that Macbeth does not see a dagger. According to our positive solution, Macbeth sees a dagger, even though there is not a dagger in front of him. (shrink)

Understood as a psychological phenomenon, there has been very little discussion of cryptomnesia in the philosophical literature. Cryptomnesia presents us with a strange phenomenon in which we take ourselves to be imagining, but the thought or idea that we entertain actually involves remembered content. In this paper, we argue for a three-factor account of cryptomnesia, according to which it is a mnemonic phenomenon that involves imagination. We provide an account of both the ‘mnemonic’ and ‘imaginative’ aspects of cryptomnesia in terms (...) of the attitude, the content, and the metacognitive processes involved in those states. In addition, we show how our three-factor account is better suited to account for cryptomnesia than competing philosophical theories of episodic memory. We conclude by discussing how the three-factor account sheds light on a range of other mnemonic and imaginative phenomena. (shrink)

The idea that episodic memory is a form of mental time travel has played an important role in the development of memory research in the last couple decades. Despite its growing importance in psychology, philosophers have only begun to develop an interest in philosophical questions pertaining to the relationship between memory and mental time travel. Thus, this paper proposes a more systematic discussion of the relationship between memory and mental time travel from the point of view of philosophy. I start (...) by discussing some of the motivations to take memory to be a form of mental time travel. I call the resulting view of memory the mental time travel view. I then proceed to consider important philosophical questions pertaining to memory and develop them in the context of the mental time travel view. I conclude by suggesting that the intersection of the philosophy of memory and research on mental time travel not only provides new perspectives to think about traditional philosophical questions, but also new questions that have not been explored before. (shrink)

Radical enactivism, an increasingly influential approach to cognition in general, has recently been applied to memory in particular, with Hutto and Peeters New directions in the philosophy of memory, Routledge, New York, 2018) providing the first systematic discussion of the implications of the approach for mainstream philosophical theories of memory. Hutto and Peeters argue that radical enactivism, which entails a conception of memory traces as contentless, is fundamentally at odds with current causal and postcausal theories, which remain committed to a (...) conception of traces as contentful: on their view, if radical enactivism is right, then the relevant theories are wrong. Partisans of the theories in question might respond to Hutto and Peeters’ argument in two ways. First, they might challenge radical enactivism itself. Second, they might challenge the conditional claim that, if radical enactivism is right, then their theories are wrong. In this paper, we develop the latter response, arguing that, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, radical enactivism in fact aligns neatly with an emerging tendency in the philosophy of memory: radical enactivists and causal and postcausal theorists of memory have begun to converge, for distinct but compatible reasons, on a contentless conception of memory traces. (shrink)

Quasi-set theory $\cal Q$ allows us to cope with certain collections of objects where the usual notion of identity is not applicable, in the sense that $x = x$ is not a formula, if $x$ is an arbitrary term. $\cal Q$ was partially motivated by the problem of non-individuality in quantum mechanics. In this paper I discuss the range of explanatory power of $\cal Q$ for quantum phenomena which demand some notion of indistinguishability among quantum objects. My main focus is (...) on the double-slit experiment, a major physical phenomenon which was never modeled from a quasi-set-theoretic point of view. The double-slit experiment strongly motivates the concept of degrees of indistinguishability within a field-theoretic approach, and that notion is simply missing in $\cal Q$. Nevertheless, other physical situations may eventually demand a revision on quasi-set theory axioms, if someone intends to use it in the quantum realm for the purpose of a clear discussion about non-individuality. I use this opportunity to suggest another way to cope with identity in quantum theories. (shrink)

The idea that episodic memory is memory of particulars is prominent in philosophy. The particularity of remembering, as I will call it, has been taken for granted in most recent theorizing on the subject. This is because the classical causal theory of memory, which has been extremely influential in philosophy, is said to provide a straightforward account of particularity. But the causal theory has been criticized recently, in particular due to its inability to make sense of the constructive character of (...) remembering. In this paper, I argue that recent attempts to account for the constructive character of remembering have failed to account for its particularity. This is either because they depart in important senses from the classical causal theory’s account of mnemonic causation or because they give up on mnemonic causation altogether. I then proceed to consider the question of whether we should go back to the classical causal theory of memory to account for particularity. I argue that, despite the widespread idea that the classical causal theory offers a straightforward account of particularity, there are good reasons to reject it. The upshot is that philosophers of memory should consider alternative accounts of particularity that do not revolve around mnemonic causation. (shrink)

In this essay I will argue that natural selection is more important to functional explanations than what has been thought in some of the literature in philosophy of biology. I start by giving a brief overview of the two paradigms cases of functional explanations: etiological functions and causal-role functions. i then consider one particular attempt to conciliate both perspectives given by David Buller. Buller's trial to conciliate both etiological functions and causal-role functions results in what he calls a weak etiological (...) theory. I argue that Buller has not succeeded in his construal of the weak etiological theory: he underestimates the role that selective processes have in functional explanations and so his theory may not be classified as an etiologial theory. As an alternative, I consider the account of etiological functions given by Ruth Millikan and I argue that Millikan's theory is more comprehensive to assess contentious case in biology like exaptations. Finally, I conclude by analyzing where the adoption of Millikan's theory leave us. I argue, contrary to Millikan and others, that once we assume the importance of natural selection in functional explanations, there is no strong reason to resist a linguistic reform of the word function and hence that the attempts to conciliate both etiological functions and causal-role functions are misplaced. (shrink)